This paper investigates whether prospect theory (PT) or a preference for lottery-like gains on stocks can explain the peculiarities of IPO returns in China. Chinese IPOs offer investors two potential lottery-like gains. One is potentially huge first day returns as Chinese issuers leave more money on the table and the other is that a particular IPO may in the long run become the next Alibaba. Consistent with the skewness preference hypothesis, we find that expected skewness is associated with high first-day returns and low long-term performance for a sample of 748 book-built Chinese IPOs issued over the 2005-2012 period. A one-standard-deviation increase in the expected skewness of an IPO stock can not only lead to an increase of 6.67 percentage points in the first-day return but also predict a decrease of 10.80-12.23 percentage points in the post-IPO abnormal return. Further analysis suggests that retail demand around the IPO event tends to increase with expected skewness, indicating that PT investors indeed overweight those extremely low probability events, leading to high first-day returns and low long-term abnormal returns.
Introduction
theoretically analyze the asset pricing implications of transformed probability weightings for security price tail events using an equilibrium model. Investors in the model exhibit a preference for positive skewness or a tendency to overpay for securities with right-skewed payoffs, a common psychological trait highlighted in both the prospect theories of Kahnman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahnman (1992) . 1 The Barberis and Huang model generates a new prediction that a positively skewed security will be overpriced relative to the valuation it would command in an economy with standard expected utility investors and will earn a negative average return.
Over the past few years, several studies provide empirical evidence consistent with this prediction, including Kumar (2009), Boyer, Mitton and Vorkink (2010) , Bali, Cakini and Whitelaw (2011), Conrad, Dittmar and Ghysels (2013) , Conrad Kapadia and Xing (2014) , Eraker and Ready (2015) , and Barberis Mukherjee and Wang (2016) . However, there is relatively few evidence in support of Barberis and Huang (2008) Why does Barberis and Huang (2008) receive so few empirical success in the IPO context? One potential reason for the gap between the theoretical analysis and its empirical support is the institutional arrangements associated with the US book-building practice. It is well documented that the book-building practice in the US and other developed markets allows their underwriters to extract private information from institutional investors to price IPO stocks.
To the extent that private information gathered from those asymmetrically informed investors in the book building can be incorporated into the offer price, the optimal choice for underwriters, as shown in Benveniste and Spindt (1989) , is to underprice new issues using part of private information. To the extent that public information can be incorporated into the offer price, the best choice for a wealth-maximizing underwriter who considers the trade-off between the potential increase in underwriting revenues and the expected cost of price support in the aftermarket as demonstrated in Derrien (2005) , is also to underprice new issues using part of public information. Using part of information to price an IPO stock can create problems for empirical tests of behavioral explanations for IPO anomalies, including skewness preferences.
Specifically, given that both the offer price and the first-day closing price are affected by the presence of sentiment investors due to their preference for the future skewness of an IPO stock's return, the same information content contained in the numerator and the denominator of the first-day return will cancel out each other by and large thus it is less likely to observe a positive relationship between expected skewness and first-day returns. For this particular reason, the empirical relationship between expected skewness and first-day returns will be underestimated in the US context.
In this article, we attempt to address the empirical problem common to IPOs in the US context and elsewhere using a sample of Chinese book-built IPOs. The Chinese context can be the most suitable test setting to examine the empirical predictions of Barberis and Huang (2008) because its institutional arrangements ensure that no information regarding the presence of investor sentiment will enter into the offer price. Pricing IPOs in China has started to follow a new double-tranche book-building approach since the year of 2005. Similar to the US practice, this new book-building approach allows the lead underwriter to solicit the buying interest of institutional investors through the first offline tranche. The offer price of a new issue decided by the first tranche will be the fixed price at which retail investors subscribe for new shares through the second online tranche. However, in sharp contrast to the US practice that share allocation is usually done at the discretion of the underwriter, it has to be done pro rata in China.
In other words, underwriters have no discretion over share allocation and all subscription orders submitted from institutional investors will receive the same rate of allocation in proportion to their subscription size. The implication of this incentive-incompatible arrangement is that the efficient price discovery mechanism associated with the traditional book-building process, an important feature recognized by Benveniste and Spindt (1989) , Sherman and Titman (2002) , Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) to shed lights on the underpricing of new issues, no longer works in China -few private information can be effectively collected in this setting, including information on the presence of investor sentiment.
We hypothesize that skewness preference can explain post-IPO prices through the presence of investor sentiment. Previous studies such as Derrien (2005) , and Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh (2006) show that the presence of investor sentiment can be important for pricing
IPOs. They both demonstrate that investor sentiment is positively related to IPO first-day returns while negatively related to post-IPO stock performance in the long run. Different from these two studies which assume the presence of retail investors is random or unpredictable, we argue that their presence can be predicted using information on the skewness of an IPO stock's return. Barberis and Huang (2008) show that a positively skewed stock can be overpriced relative to the price that it would command in an economy with expected utility investors, due to the presence of PT investors. Holding constant the number of new shares issued for an IPO stock, the first-day closing price is largely decided by the demand created by PT investors. The higher the expected skewness, the greater the retail demand, and the greater the first-day return.
Therefore, there should be a positive relationship between the expected skewness of an IPO stock and its first-day return. To the extent that PT investors realize their valuation mistakes over longer horizons, there should be a negative relationship between expected skewness and the long-run performance of an IPO stock.
To examine this skewness preference hypothesis, we use the approach proposed by Zhang (2006b) and also employed by Green and Hwang (2012) more recently to measure how lottery-like an IPO stock's return distribution is. Specifically, we use all stocks that belong to the same industry defined by 2-digit SIC codes and their monthly returns over the three-month period before the offering date to generate the return distribution for a certain industry. We estimate the expected skewness of an IPO stock's return using the tail of this probability distribution. A positive value, known as right skewness, indicates that the right tail of industry returns is further away from the median than its left tail.
We find evidence consistent with Barberis and Huang (2008) The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description of institutional background and hypothesis development. Section 3 explains data, sample and variables of interest used in this study before Section 4 presents results for our main analysis and some additional tests. Section 5 provides a concluding remark. Under the new book-building approach, two separate tranches determine the pricing of an IPO and the allocation of shares, respectively. In the first tranche, participation in book building is limited to institutional investors and the IPO offer price is assessed on the basis of those bids obtained for a fixed quantity of the IPO stock offered for sale. This process is very similar to the one in the USA: i) institutional investors can bid for new issues at various prices; ii) the underwriter collects these bids and builds up the order book which records the demand for an 8 IPO stock; iii) the final offer price is not determined until the end of the process.
Institutional background and hypothesis development
One aspect that separates the expected outcome of the book-building approach in China from that in the USA is the incentive mechanism for share allocation among institutional investors in the first tranche. In the USA, the issuer and the underwriter determine the allocation of shares between bidders at their discretion. The latter can ensure that aggressive bidders will be rewarded with large share allocations for revealing value-relevant information truthfully.
However, there is no discretion in the Chinese context -share allocation must be implemented pro rata between institutional investors. Every participating institutional investor ends up with the same allocation rate. Thus institutional investors are not encourages to reveal their private information and so value-relevant information collected through the Chinese book building process is insufficient to ensure effective price discovery.
In the second tranche, retail investors submit their orders for the shares of an IPO stock at the fixed price determined in the first tranche. In cases of oversubscription -and the vast majority of Chinese IPOs are oversubscribed -share allocation between retail investors must be implemented through a pure lottery mechanism. The latter is the second distinctive feature of the Chinese IPO process. Under the lottery mechanism, every 1,000 shares subscribed will be assigned one lottery ticket which carries a unique lottery number. This lottery mechanism for share allocation 3 is one of two key aspects of the lottery-like nature of Chinese IPOs during the course of our sample period. It seems likely to induce retail investors to regard making an IPO subscription order as akin to buying a lottery ticket. The potential reward for those lucky investors receiving an allocation is the possibility of a stake in China's next Alibaba.
Related literature and the skewness hypothesis
Psychologists have provided convincing evidence that individuals tend to overweight lowprobability outcomes in their decision making relative to the weight that the outcome would receive under expected utility theory. The most notable example is that people usually prefer a gain of $5,000 with a small chance of 0.1% to a certain gain of $5, while they also demonstrate a strong preference for a certain loss of $5 over a loss of $5,000 with a small probability of 9 0.1%. Under the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) cumulative prospect theory framework, the preferences revealed in the example implies: Building upon previous theoretical analysis and empirical findings, we posit that retail demand for an IPO stock is driven by the skewness of its return distribution. Barberis and Huang (2008) show that securities can be overpriced due to the fact that some investors exhibit a preference those with high skewness. If investors demonstrate a skewness preference for IPOs and overpay for high skewness IPO shares on the first day of trading, this implies a positive relationship between first-day returns and expected skewness.
Hypothesis 1: First-day returns are positively related to expected skewness.
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The logical next question is whether the initial overvaluation due to skewness preference tends to reverse in the long run. At the heart of Barberis and Huang (2008) view is the novel prediction that securities with high skewness will generate low average returns in the future. In the IPO context, if initial overvaluation is really driven by skewness preference, then expected skewness can predict long-run reversal in IPO stock prices. Note that this return reversal has nothing to do with fundamentals or other behavioral explanations.
Hypothesis 2: Long-run abnormal returns are negatively related to expected skewness.
Finally, can skewness preference impact on the presence of investor sentiment? The skewness preference hypothesis rests on an implicit assumption that retail investors' buying decision is closely related to the skewness of an IPO stock's return. Assuming that the population of retail investors is fixed and their skewness preference is constant over time, the number of retail investors attracted to the IPO market will depend on how lottery-like an IPO stock is. The higher the expected skewness, the greater the retail demand is likely to be for an IPO stock. This forms the basis of our third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Retail demand is positively related to expected skewness. 
Data, sample and variables

Data and sample
where Percentilek is the k th percentile of the log monthly return distribution across all stocks that fall within the same 2-digit SIC industry as an IPO stock j. The numerator measures the distance of each tail from the median and is positive for right-skewed distributions. The denominator gives the dispersion of the distribution. The expected skewness measure is based on the tails of the return distribution and so departs from the traditional third central moment 12 measure of skewness.
First-day return
We follow the literature and define the first-day return as the percentage difference between the offer price and the first-day closing price:
where Pj,1 is the first-day closing price and Pj,0 is the offer price.
Long-term performance
Following Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999), we consider both the event-time BHAR (buy and hold abnormal return) and the calendar-time abnormal return estimated using factor regressions to Specifically, we regress the monthly returns in excess of the risk-free rate for IPO firms on three monthly risk factors. We define the post-IPO abnormal monthly return as the intercept estimated from time-series regressions after adjusting for risk compensation: , SMB and HML are the monthly excess return on the market, the average return on three small portfolios minus the average return on three big portfolios, and the average return on two value portfolios minus the average return on two growth portfolios, respectively, with six size-value portfolios constructed in a manner similar to Fama and French (1993) .
Control variables
Previous studies document that a number of variables can be relevant for first-day returns or 
Main Results
Descriptive statistics
Expected skewness and first-day returns
We estimate the following regression to examine whether there is a positive relationship between expected skewness and first-day returns:
where IR is the first-day return of an IPO stock; Skewness is the expected skewness; X is a vector of control variables. Table 2 summarizes the regression results.
[Insert Table 2 around here]
Column (1) give the results for a regression that includes all variables (including three proxies for investor sentiment) except Skewness as independent variables to explain first-day returns.
It reveals that first-day returns are significantly positively related to leverage (Leverage), the fraction of state ownership (State), and the divergence of analyst forecasts (Analysts_std) and significantly negatively related to issue size (IssueSize) and firm age (Age). When Skewness is included in the regression, the results in Column (2) indicates that a significantly positive relationship between expected skewness and first-day returns after controlling for other firm characteristics. Given the coefficient estimate of Skewness is 0.248, significant at the 5% level, and the standard deviation of Skewness is 0.2689 as reported in Table 1 , a one-standard deviation increase in expected skewness would lead to an increase of some 6.67 percentage points (=0.248*0.2689) in first-day returns on average.
This finding is consistent with Barberis and Huang (2008) who posit that high first-day returns are driven by high first-day closing prices due to PT investors demonstrating a strong skewness preference rather than by low offer prices. It complements Green and Hwang (2012) who find evidence of a significant positive relationship between first-day returns and expected skewness for a sample of 7,975 US IPOs issued during the 1975-2008 period. They find a significant coefficient estimate of 0.327 on expected skewness without any control variables, indicating a one-standard-deviation increase in the expected skewness leads to a 4.45% increase in first-day returns. Including control variables, the coefficient on right skewness is a significant 0.153 but that on expected skewness falls to 0.063.
The key to the above finding is whether the explanatory power of skewness preference might be subsumed by proxies for other behavioral explanations since skewness preference may not be the only reason for the impact of investor sentiment. To shed lights on this issue, we control for the potential impacts of other behavioral explanations by including measures of investor sentiment in the regressions specified in Columns (3) -(6). Three different measures included in our analysis are: 1) Orders, defined as the number of valid subscription orders received for the second offline tranche, 2) RMB, the value of demand defined as the number of new shares subscribed multiplied by the offer price, and 3) Allocation, defined as the allocation rate among retail investors using the lottery approach. A larger value of Orders and RMB indicate a stronger retail demand while a larger value of Allocation suggests that retail demand is not excessive. For the regression in Column (3) which includes Orders as well as Skewness, the coefficient on Skewness is 0.225 (t-statistics = 2.48). For the regression in Column (4), which includes both Skewness and RBM, the coefficient on Skewness is 0.227 (t-statistics = 2.52). In Column (5) where we include Skewness as well as Allocation, the coefficient on Skewness is 0.233 (t-statistics = 2.59). In the results in Column (6) which include Skewness and 16 three measures for investor sentiment, the coefficient on Skewness is 0.209 (t-statistics = 2.30).
These findings suggest that the positive relationship between expected skewness and first-day returns is robust not only to a set of control variables but also to alternative behavioral explanations.
Expected skewness and long-term performance
We examine the relationship between long-term performance and expected skewness by estimating the following two regressions:
where BHAR is the buy-and-hold return of an IPO stock in the 36 post-IPO event months relative to the buy-and-hold return of a size and B/M comparable non-IPO stock over the same period; Jensen's_Alpha is the abnormal monthly return estimated from the Fama-French threefactor model over the 36 post-IPO calendar months; Skewness is the expected skewness of an IPO stock; X is a vector of control variables.
The regression results are presented in Table 3 .
[ Table 3 around here]
The table reveals robust evidence of a negative relationship between long-term performance and expected skewness as predicted by Barberis and Huang (2008 over three and five years following the issuance between the top and bottom third skewness portfolios. However, while they find that high-skewness IPO firms significantly underperform their matching firms at the three-and five-year horizons, their results using a calendar-time matching firm approach do not produce strong evidence of a significant difference in abnormal returns for monthly portfolios sorted by expected skewness.
Our approach differs from that in Green and Hwang (2012) at least in three different respects. First, we use the BHAR in the event-time approach and the Jensen's alpha in the calendar-time approach to measuring long-term performance, both of which are reported more reliable as documented in Lyon et al. (1999) . Second, the finding of a negative relationship between expected skewness and long-term performance is robust to alternative measures of long-term abnormal returns. Finally, our finding is consistent with previous studies which document a negative relationship between first-day returns and long-run stock performance, including Ritter (1991) and Shen et al. (2013) .
Expected skewness and retail demand
Our analysis has produced a positive relationship between expected skewness and first-day returns and a negative relationship between expected skewness and long-term stock performance. We have shown that the positive relationship between expected skewness and first-day return is robust to controlling for retail demand and that the negative relationship 18 between expected skewness and long-run abnormal returns is also robust to controlling for retail demand, However, it is possible that these results may be driven by retail demand. To strengthen the belief that retail demand affects first-day returns through the skewness channel, we thus investigate the relationship between retail demand and expected skewness by estimating the following three regressions.
where Orders is the number of retail investors defined as the number of valid subscription orders received from retail investors in the second tranche; RMB is a measure of retail demand defined as the number of new shares subscribed multiplied by the offer price; Allocation is the rate of allocation between retail investors using the lottery approach; Skewness is the expected skewness of an IPO stock; X is a vector of control variables. Table 4 presents the regression results.
[ Table 4 around here]
Using three different measures for retail demand, we find robust evidence of a positive relationship between expected skewness and retail demand. In Panel A where the dependent variable is Orders, the coefficient on Skewness is a significant 142,341.1 (t-statistics = 2.81).
High Skewness IPO stocks are associated with a greater number of retail orders placed by PT investors. The results in Panel B (where the dependent variable is RMB) and in Panel C (where the dependent variable is Allocation) are weaker and significant only at the 10% significance level. These findings suggests that the skewness of an IPO stock can predict the presence of retail investors in the IPO market, thus consistent with our argument that skewness preference affects post-IPO prices through retail demand in the pre-IPO period.
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Conclusions
This paper takes advantage of two unique institutional arrangements in the Chinese IPO market to examine whether skewness preference can influence post-IPO prices through the presence of investor sentiment. First, share allocation among institutional investors participating in the book-building process is not at the discretion of IPO underwriters in China and this is likely to hamper effective price discovery. The implication is that the IPO offer price contains much less private information elicited from institutional investors than it does in advanced markets like that in the USA. The concern that the empirical relationship between first-day returns and expected skewness will be underestimated can be alleviated using Chinese book-built IPOs. Second, retail demand for IPO stocks should be released to the general public so we can use its direct measure to complement the literature which relies largely on indirect This table provides descriptive statistics for variables used in this study. Skewness is the expected skewness of an IPO stock's return defined using the tails of the probability distribution generated by monthly returns of all stocks in the same industry over the three-month period before the offer date; IR is the first-day return of an IPO stock defined as the percentage difference between its first-day closing price and its offer price; BHAR is the buy-and-hold return of an IPO stock in the 36 post-IPO event months relative to the buy-and-hold return of a size and B/M comparable non-IPO stock over the same period of time; Jensen's Alpha is the abnormal monthly return estimated from the Fama-French threefactor model over the 36 post-IPO calendar months; ROA is net incomes over total assets in the pre-IPO year; Leverage is the leverage ratio, estimated as total liabilities over total assets prior to listing; Profitability is the percentage difference between the offering P/E and the industry P/E; IssueSize is the IPO proceeds measured as the offer price multiplied by the number of new shares offered; Underwriter is a dummy, equal to 1 if the lead underwriter has been recognized as one of top 10 underwriters, at least two times over the past three years, and 0 otherwise; Big4 is a dummy, equal to 1 if financial reporting is audited by one of big 4 accounting firms; VC-backed is a dummy, equal to 1 if the firm has been supported by venture capital; State is the proportional of state holdings in the firm; Tradable is the proportion of tradable shares; Age is the firm age since establishment; TimeLag is the number of days elapsed between offering and listing; Analysts_std is the standard deviation of one-year forward looking EPS by analysts; Analysts_bias is defined as the average difference between analyst's forecasting EPS and realized EPS; MktSent1 is the number of IPOs in the same calendar month; MktSent3 is the market return in the same calendar month; Orders is the number of valid subscription orders received using the online fixed-price approach; RMB is the number of new shares offered multiplied by the offer price; Allocation is the rate of allocation between retail investors using the lottery approach. This table reports regression results for the relationship between expected skewness and first-day returns. The dependent variable is IR, the first-day return of an IPO stock defined as the percentage difference between its first-day closing price and its offer price. We use three measures to control for the presence of investor sentiment: Orders defined as the number of valid subscription orders received from the second offline tranche, RMB defined as the number of new shares subscribed multiplied by the offer price, and Allocation defined as the rate of allocation between retail investors using the lottery approach. Skewness is the expected skewness of an IPO stock's return defined as the tail of the probability distribution generated by monthly returns of all stocks in the same industry over the three-month period before the offer date; ROA is net incomes over total assets in the pre-IPO year; Leverage is the leverage ratio, estimated as total liabilities over total assets prior to listing; Profitability is the percentage difference between the offering P/E and the industry P/E; IssueSize is the IPO proceeds measured as the offer price multiplied by the number of new shares offered; Underwriter is a dummy, equal to 1 if the lead underwriter has been recognized as one of top 10 underwriters, at least two times over the past three years, and 0 otherwise; Big4 is a dummy, equal to 1 if financial reporting is audited by one of big 4 accounting firms; VC-backed is a dummy, equal to 1 if the firm has been supported by venture capital; State is the proportional of state holdings in the firm; Orders is the number of valid subscription orders received from the second offline tranche; RMB is defined as the number of new shares subscribed multiplied by the offer price; Allocation is the rate of allocation between retail investors using the lottery approach; IR is the first-day return of an IPO stock defined as the percentage difference between its first-day closing price and its offer price; Skewness is the expected skewness of an IPO stock's return defined as the tail of the probability distribution generated by monthly returns of all stocks in the same industry over the three-month period before the offer date; ROA is net incomes over total assets in the pre-IPO year; Leverage is the leverage ratio, estimated as total liabilities over total assets prior to listing; Profitability is the percentage difference between the offering P/E and the industry P/E; IssueSize is the logarithm of IPO proceeds measured as the offer price multiplied by the number of new shares offered; Underwriter is a dummy, equal to 1 if the lead underwriter has been recognized as one of top 10 underwriters, at least two times over the past three years, and 0 otherwise; Big4 is a dummy, equal to 1 if financial reporting is audited by one of big 4 accounting firms; VC-backed is a dummy The dependent variable in Panel C is Allocation defined as the rate of allocation between retail investors using the lottery approach. Skewness is the expected skewness of an IPO stock's return defined as the tail of the probability distribution generated by monthly returns of all stocks in the same industry over the three-month period before the offer date; ROA is net incomes over total assets in the pre-IPO year; Leverage is the leverage ratio, estimated as total liabilities over total assets prior to listing; Profitability is the percentage difference between the offering P/E and the industry P/E; IssueSize is the IPO proceeds measured as the offer price multiplied by the number of new shares offered; Underwriter is a dummy, equal to 1 if the lead underwriter has been recognized as one of top 10 underwriters, at least two times over the past three years, and 0 otherwise; Big4 is a dummy, equal to 1 if financial reporting is audited by one of big 4 accounting firms; VC-backed is a dummy All lottery tickets are numbered sequentially and enter for the lottery draw that follows for a particular IPO. The allocation rate for an IPO stock is defined as the number of shares offered divided by the number of shares subscribed. Assuming that the allocation rate is 0.05733852%, the detailed process for identifying winning lottery tickets is illustrated as follows:
a) The first step is to identify those winning tickets for the 0.05% allocation rate. The defined procedure is that five different tickets with ticket numbers ending with four particular numerals will be selected from every 10,000 consecutive numbers. For example, four numerals drawn from a random device in one particular order are 3473. Since five different combinations must be distributed uniformly over the neighborhood of 3473, some adjustments are needed to identify the other four combinations. If dividing the total number of lottery tickets by the number of winning tickets yields a whole number, adjustments are the whole number and its multiples. In this case, 10,000/5 produces the whole number 2,000, and thus using 2,000 and its multiples, the winning ticket numbers identified for the allocation rate of 0.05% are those ending up with 3437, 5437 (=3,437+2,000), 7437 (=3,437+2,000*2), 9437 (=3,437+2,000*3) and 1437 (=3,437-2,000).
b) The second step is to identify those winning tickets for the 0.007% allocation rate.
Analogously, there will be a total of 7 tickets to be decided for each 100,000 tickets and they must be distributed evenly across its neighboring area. For illustration purpose, let us assume that a particular combination of numerals such as 10256 is randomly decided and we have to identify the other six combinations. Since dividing 100,000 by 7 does not give a whole number, the guideline suggests that we should take 0.007% as the sum of 0.005% and 0.002% and proceed to identify five combinations for each 100,000 and two combinations for each 100,000.
In the latter two cases, we will obtain a whole number for adjustment for sure. In the former case where the allocation rate is 0.005%, adjustments are 20,000 (=100,000/5) and its multiples while in the latter case where the allocation rate is 0.002%, adjustments are 50,000 and its multiples. Following the same procedure, the winning numbers identified for the allocation rate of 0.007% are those ending up with 10256, 30256 (=10,256+20,000*1), 50256 (=10,256+20,000*2), 70256 (=10,256+20,000*3), 90256 (=10,256+20,000*4), 358247, 85824 (=35,824+50,000*1); c) Those winning combinations for the 0.0003% allocation rate and beyond are identified in a similar fashion.
